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Abstract. Th is paper recognizes a specifi c correspondence between biological 
evolution and technological development and on this basis tries to set up a semiotic 
approach to the evolutionary phenomenon of exaptation. To do this, the existence 
of a historical-structural and pragmatic analogy between organs and tools is shown, 
which in turn implies on a communicative ground the dissolution of some of their 
traditional distinctive att ributes. Finally, a philosophical-analytical approach to 
natural and cultural functions is applied to defi ne three types of exaptations.
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1. Introduction
For Stephen Jay Gould and Elizabeth Vrba the notion of exaptation defi nes those 
biological traits that “are fi t for their current role, hence aptus, but they were not 
designed for it, and are therefore not ad aptus, or pushed towards fi tness. Th ey owe 
their fi tness to features present for other reasons, and are therefore fi t (aptus) by 
reason of (ex) their form, or ex aptus” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6). As a classic example, 
birds do not have feathers because they were originally designed to perform the 
function of fl ight, rather they were co-opted from the original use they had in 
dinosaurs, where they served as means of thermoregulation. 
Since the concept was proposed as a response to the predominance of adaptation 
in the neo-Darwinian paradigm for evolutionary change, this article follows the same 
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critical approach and the theoretical framework of reference adopted to address its 
analysis is the research program of biosemiotics, namely a semiotic science whose 
paramount heuristic principle consists in the view that a sign-based modelling of 
living organism can provide a bett er understanding than traditional (physicalist or 
neo-Darwinian) approaches within mainstream biology (Kull et al. 2008). 
Th is said, what would it mean to work out a (bio)semiotic model of exaptation? 
On one side, a model is a “form of meaning” that stands for something else (Sebeok, 
Danesi 2000: 2), namely a system of ordered elements conveying some kind of 
information about a specifi c reality; on the other side, by being “a trait […] that 
confers performance advantage in a particular way at a specifi c time but was not 
produced by natural selection for that use” (Arnold 1994: 126; emphasis mine), 
exaptation covers a specifi c subset of instances of functional change in the relational 
properties of a character. Hence, a semiotic account of exaptation is based on the 
schematic representation (Krampen 1997: 248) of the factors involved in the non-
selective and non-adaptive (in Gould and Vrba’s sense) evolutionary generation of 
new connections within the organism-environment dynamics.
Th is project is grounded on the idea of an analogy between diff erent objects of 
analysis: in order to take a model developed within a specifi c discipline – semiotics – 
and exploit it in a diff erent one – biology – the existence of common features 
between their respective domains must be assumed preliminarily. When it comes 
to exaptation, a commonsensical assimilatory comparison is oft en advanced to 
illustrate what the shift  in the performance of a biological structure might look like; 
at the end of the exposition it will appear clear how deep and striking this insight is 
and its value in the detection and adoption of a concrete model.
In his study on the evolution of complex organs, and to facilitate the reader’s 
understanding, T. Ryan Gregory (2008) draws a parallel between the mechanism 
of biological functional shift  and the way a common everyday object – a coin – has 
been given a new use in recent years. If the primary function of a coin was and still is 
as currency, the appearance of a new conditioning situation (lott ery tickets covered 
by removable coating) has turned it into a lott ery tickets scraper as well. Moreover, 
because of the diffi  culty to scratch just by holding it between the thumb and index 
fi nger, the coin has being integrated in a keychain that ensures a bett er grip. Th is 
exemplifi cation is remarkable in two ways.
First of all, it allows of a handy and concrete translation of Edwin Nicholas 
Arnold’s conceptual terminology adopted in his important contribution (Arnold 
1994) on exaptation. With this term he refers to traits that “arose in some other 
way, and only subsequently acquired the performance advantage and use under 
consideration, usually as a result of change in the selective regime” (Arnold 1994: 
126). Similarly, some properties of the coin, including the abrasive nature of its 
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edges, had not been conceived to perform the scraping function, but the interest in 
this function is what became relevant additionally as soon as they were diff erently 
exploited in a new context. 
Besides, Arnold articulates diff erent kinds of exaptations: fi rst use exaptations, 
where “a trait has no performance advantage at its origin, gaining one only when 
subsequently coopted to the use in question” (Arnold 1994: 137); extra-use 
exaptations (the trait is already performing a function before change), divided into 
addition exaptations, “when the new use is merely added to the fi rst” (Arnold 1994: 
138), and transfer exaptations, “involving a shift  to a new use with loss of the original 
one” (Arnold 1994: 138). Back to Gregory’s example, before becoming useful in 
the construction of human tools, metal (which also coins are made of) had not had 
any peculiar workable function and only later was recruited for currency exchange. 
All the same, its scratching use in the form of a coin is an additional function that 
by no means substitutes its monetary value. Th e choice of the coin is particularly 
interesting because, as for the material employed, it presupposes the succession 
of three historical moments: tool production, monetary value (maintaining that 
currency and work instruments are diff erent kinds of tools) and scraping utility. And 
such alternate phases characterize exaptation as well.
Coming to the second benefi t of Gregory’s example, it off ers the opportunity 
to highlight two other important points made by Arnold. In the fi rst instance, 
“although the evolutionary role of fi rst-use exaptations has been emphasized […] 
these appear to be relatively rare. […] Extra-use exaptations, on the other hand, 
seem to be far more common…they may be a more immediately eff ective source of 
aptations in many situations than adaptations” (Arnold 1994: 144). In the second 
instance, “[f]eatures of organisms that become exaptations are oft en quite complex 
and have not arisen from a single evolutionary event. Not infrequently, they are 
the result of a series of likely adaptations oft en widely separated in time” (Arnold 
1994: 137), which has to be interpreted not only singularly, in the sense of multiple 
functional shift s and adaptive refi nements of a single trait, but also collectively, since 
its cooption can be caused by an ensemble of elements that all together perform 
a defi nite function, as in the case of the eye described by Gregory (2008: 372). 
Th at is, sometimes “existing components, be they functional for something else 
or nonfunctional initially, are brought together or rearranged to form a new, more 
complex combination with a novel function” (Gregory 2008: 364). Th is is another 
way to say that the performance of a trait is a systemic property depending on the 
whole (in which it happens to become a part), where the requirements demanded 
by the general function of the latt er specify the particular usefulness of the former.
Extra-usage and complexity are also key features of technology production and 
tools manufacturing closely resembles the occurrence of some exaptations: the coin 
was already at hand before being exploited for a new use and the innovative functions 
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was what caused the recruitment of the keychain, which before had never meant to 
be a coin-holder. Th e following quotation by Deborah A. McLennan suitably sum-
marizes this general idea of a resemblance between the way instruments are assem-
bled and the evolutionary process by which nature produces some of its creations:
Th e co-option of traits to serve new functions is not a diffi  cult concept to 
understand. In fact, we ourselves do it all the time [...]. We are forever fi nding 
new functions for old devices, using an old boot as a planter, a fi shing rod to 
fl y a kite, a magnifying glass to start a fi re, a shell as currency, a berry or a root 
to dye cloth. Th e only diff erence between human and evolutionary co-option 
is that we purposefully change an object’s function, while evolution simply 
takes advantage of an opportunity with no direction, purpose, or forethought. 
(McLennan 2008: 257)
Th is analogy places itself within a complex multidisciplinary context where similar 
unitary interpretations of seemingly diff erent phenomena have already been 
suggested. Th erefore, before moving on, a brief outline of the background panorama 
from which it stands out is needed; moreover, this sketch will clarify with more 
precision the specifi c contribution made by my research. 
Th e current topic is part of a wider debate on the parallelism between biology 
and culture and, strictly related, between biological and cultural evolution. 
With respect to the latt er there are as many subcategories of development – and 
accordingly as many analogies to the organic evolutionary process – as there are 
distinct interconnected subsystems that make up culture itself, such as for instance 
scientifi c progress, conceptual turn, language change and technological innovation. 
Besides, an appropriate typology of these possible interactions should carry out a 
whole series of distinctions: between the source and target spheres of assimilative 
interpretation; whether the comparison has to be understood literally or just hints 
to an analogy; whether it concerns the functional status of the elements at stake 
or just their development; eventually, it should take into account possible mutual 
interactions within the cultural sphere in general. 
As a fi rst qualifi cation, my reasoning focuses its att ention on the affi  nities 
detectable between biological evolution and technological innovation, with three 
distinctive points: fi rstly, it interprets the former on the basis of the latt er; secondly, 
it is limited to the recognition of an analogy between the two spheres; thirdly, it 
splits the comparison up into a twofold similarity concerning the constitution and 
function of organs and tools.
As a second qualifi cation, it adopts what it is generally considered and defi ned 
as a post-Darwinian approach, since it places adaptation by means of natural 
selection side by side with complementary processes eliciting micro- and macro-
evolutionary transformations. In this way, it anticipates and possibly counters 
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one probable objection: if technological innovations fall under the rubric of non-
random intelligent design, how can they be compared to a process triggered by 
casual variations? Th e existence and description of mechanisms of evolution both 
escaping the paradigmatic neo-Darwinian sequence (chance variation, inheritance, 
diff erential reproduction and adaptation) and implying the evolutionary eff ective-
ness of the environmental responsiveness of organisms provide a more suitable 
biological-theoretical background for the analogy to be drawn. In this respect, 
Hoff meyer (1996, 2008), Hoff meyer, Kull (2003), Markoš (2002), Markoš et al. 
(2009) and Kull (1998; 1999; 2004) are essential references to frame the issue. 
Besides, an extensive work thereupon is provided by West-Eberhard (2003).
 Such a tension between neo- and post-Darwinism can already be sensed within 
existing refl ections. Th e idea that new technologies arise as a result of variations 
of old ones and selective pressure against their diverse eff ectiveness, so as to yield 
diff erential spreading, is supported for instance by Basalla (1988) and Constant 
(1980) (further references for a Darwinian approach are: Gilfi llan 1935; Mokyr 
1990; Saviott i, Metcalfe 1991; Metcalfe 1998). However, Arthur (2007; 2009) 
is more relevant here, since he agrees only in part with these interpretations and 
introduces a key distinction: “I do not want to dismiss variation and selection 
in technology. […] But when we face the key question of how radically novel 
technologies originate […] we get stymied. Darwin’s mechanism does not work” 
(Arthur 2009: 18). Besides, as for the introduction of novel solutions, he detects a 
mechanism quite similar to exaptation: “Th is lock-in of an older successful principle 
causes a phenomenon I will call adaptive stretch. When a new circumstance comes 
along or a demand for a diff erent sphere of application arrives, it is easier to reach for 
the old technology – the old base principle – and adapt it by “stretching” it to cover 
the new circumstances” (Arthur 2009: 140). Scholars who have focused expressly 
on framing and modelling technical progress from the viewpoint of an exaptation-
based evolutionary theory are Allen and Andriani (2007) and Catt ani (2005).
As a third qualifi cation, my approach stands in continuity with previous 
linguistic and semiotic interpretations of technological change. For Arthur (2009: 
76) a “domain” or body of technologies “forms a language; and a new technological 
artifact constructed from components of the domain is an utt erance in the domain’s 
language. […] the key activity in technology – engineering design – is a form of 
composition. It is expression within a language (or several)”. Since the domain/
artefact distinction resembles the langue/parole opposition, technology appears as 
a system whose single concretizations obey its grammatical rules of combination 
(Arthur 2009: 77). Similarly, Lotman (1991) takes a semiotic perspective on the 
issue and his contextualization of technological progress within culture theory 
and semiotics of cultural points indirectly to a biosemiotic interpretation as well, 
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by virtue of the well acknowledged analogy between the notions of biosphere and 
semiosphere (see for instance Markoš 2004; Kotov, Kull 2011; Lotman 2005). 
Finally, Innis (2009) claims for the application of diff erent semiotic conceptual 
tools and frameworks – Jakob von Uexküll’s biologically based theory of meaning, 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s typology of signs, Ferdinand de Saussure’s model of 
language as a dynamic system of diff erences and Ernst Cassirer’s model based on 
the triadic schematization of the forms of sense – to highlight quite diff erent, but 
nevertheless complementary, features of technology. 
2. The analogy of production
In order to develop the argument, this section is providing some defi nitions of 
technology and taking into account, as concrete examples of comparison, a light bulb 
on one side and the case study of exaptation described by Gregory – the evolution 
of the eye – on the other side. Th e central idea can be summarized as follows: 
instruments and organs are similar in the way they are produced by, respectively, 
man and nature.
Firstly, since designed as a tool to satisfy or support human intentions, “[a] 
technology fulfi lls some expressed purpose – some need – personally or socially 
perceived” (Arthur 2007: 278; my emphasis): a technological artifact, or, bett er, its 
process of realization, always proceeds from a need and ends up fi nding a solution 
for a problem. It does not matt er whether it is the case of a new economic chance or 
an emerging market to be exploited: a requirement and its fulfi llment are always at 
stake. Th is clearly holds for the light bulb: thanks to the progress in the knowledge 
of electric phenomena, man was able to get rid of previous constraints (day-night 
alternation and usage of oil lamps) and secure a stable and versatile source of artifi cial 
light for daily activities. But a similar reasoning can be applied to the eye as well: once 
appeared in the form of simple photo-pigment, it increasingly enabled its carriers 
to bett er fulfi ll their needs for food identifi cation, locomotion, predator avoidance, 
and so forth. Hence, both historical processes can be classifi ed as problem-solving 
situations, which can be addressed with or without the participation of anticipatory 
intentionality. 
Secondly, “[a] technology is built always around the reliable exploitation of some 
base phenomenon as envisaged through some principle of use” (Arthur 2007: 278), 
that is, technological artifacts are based upon one or more natural eff ects, whether 
they be chemical, physical, magnetic or electrical. As for the incandescent light 
bulb, among various phenomena it harnesses the (physical) Joule eff ect, concerning 
the ratio between the intensity of current fl ow through a conductor and the heat 
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generated, and the (chemical) property of argon gas to be inert, namely not to take 
part in the reactions occurring in the same environment where it is. But the same is 
also true of the eye and several interconnected facts are required for its functioning: 
the property of a molecule (chromophore) to change its physical conformation when 
interacting with light; the involvement of a protein (opsin) “in the chemical cascade 
that transduces the incoming light to an electrical signal” (Gregory 2008: 372); 
the convergence of light rays towards the photoreceptors, which is accomplished 
by exploiting their refracting and refl ecting capacity; and so on. As before, natural 
organs and artifi cial instruments can be categorized together as solutions to 
problems that both take advantage of one or several natural phenomena. 
Th irdly, “[a] technology requires other sub-principles (and therefore sub-
components) for its practical working. It consists of components that are themselves 
technologies […] the whole arranged in a recursive hierarchy” (Arthur 2007: 278). 
On one side, the already existing components are thought of as functionalities, 
namely “generic actions or operations that lie at hand” (Arthur 2007: 283; emphasis 
mine); on the other side, they enter as building blocks in to a combinatorial procedure. 
Hence, “we think of new technologies […] as combination of existing technologies 
possibly going on to become building blocks for future descendant technologies” 
(Arthur 2007: 284; emphasis mine). 
Looking at the elements that make up the light bulb, before this particular 
application the glass had always been used as a means to fulfi ll other needs thanks 
to its optic and chemical natural properties; as such, it was a previous existing 
technology in respect to its following adaptation to the function of gas container. 
Th e same holds for the wires employed to transport the current fl ux or the screw 
shape of the bulb base: before their recruitment, both were there for other reasons. 
Above all, the respective functional shift s occurred by means of their recombination 
in a new ensemble, so that what was actually new in the invention of incandescence 
light bulb was the arrangement of components and their relations.
Th e evolution of the eye can be described in the same technological terms, 
namely as the manifold re-functionalization of previously used elements. For 
instance, the fi rst photo-pigment arose from the combination of two preexisting 
molecules (retinal and opsin) that, in addition to the eye, can be found elsewhere 
in the organism and serve several non-visual functions: they “predate the origin of 
vision, and their merger and subsequent specialization in visual systems represents 
an important example of evolution through collage, exaptation, and secondary 
adaptation” (Gregory 2008: 372). All the same, refractive proteins (crystallins) 
located in the lenses “are not only similar but identical to proteins that serve other 
functions in the eye and elsewhere in the body” (Gregory 2008: 376) and became 
co-opted and refi ned for the new role in association with photoreceptors, to which 
they had now to redirect and focus sunlight.
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On this basis, it is possible again to associate organic and artifi cial objects and 
link them in this case to the concept of combination: the reuse of the old can 
happen in isolation, but it oft en involves the assembly of many elements, each of 
them solving a ‘minor’ sub-problem in a parts-whole recursive way, functional to the 
overall systemic working.
Before turning to the next analogy, a fi nal comment is necessary on Arthur’s 
reasoning about the diff erences between technological and biological evolution. 
While critically discussing the assumption that a novel technology might arise from 
a process of variation and selection of old technologies, Arthur stresses that “[t]his 
idea has a certain Darwinian appeal, and it has validity with respect to improvements 
in technology. But it does not hold up for what interests us here: radical invention 
by deliberate human design” (Arthur 2007: 275; emphasis mine). Since they are 
thought of as complementary phenomena – “while I talk here about the creation 
of radically novel technologies, I recognize that the step-by-step improvement of 
existing technologies is economically just as important” (Arthur 2007: 276) – 
the main problem regards their distinction: “[w]hat, in our context, allows one 
new technology to qualify as radically novel, and relegates another to be a mere 
improvement on or variation of some standard design?” (Arthur 2007: 277). Th e 
answer is the following: “I will therefore defi ne a new (radically novel) technology 
as one that achieves a purpose by using a new or diff erent base principle than used 
before” (Arthur 2007: 278). 
However, from a post-Darwinian viewpoint, Arthur’s idea of a “Darwinian 
appeal” insofar the perfecting of existing technologies is concerned is half true 
and betrays a partial consideration of the biological evolutionary process. Small, 
continuous and inheritable chance variations of a functional trait and its bett er 
adaptation to the environment by means of natural selection are but one way 
through which evolution acts to transform species. Exaptive phenomena prove that 
relatively radical novelties do occur in nature and therefore the complementarity 
of re-functionalization and improvement, ascribed by Arthur just to technological 
development, can be extended to the organic domain as well. Going back to the 
eye, once crystallins became coopted to perform the new function of refraction in 
association with photoreceptors, then there occurred a “[g]radual evolution of lens 
crystallin concentrations resulting in evolution of graded refractive index lenses 
in aquatic animals” (Gregory 2008: 374). Just as the diff erent level of effi  ciency 
between ancient and contemporary forms of light bulbs, so in biological history 
“any coopted structure (an exaptation) will probably not arise perfected for its new 
eff ect. It will therefore develop secondary adaptations for the new role” (Gould, 
Vrba 1982: 12). 
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3. The pragmatic analogy
Along with the acknowledgement that complex organic units and instrumental 
artifacts come into existence following a common historical path of production, the 
previous section has also implicitly shown that, beyond the specifi c function to be 
executed, they both represent at large forms of action and mediation characterizing 
the relationship with the environment. In order to bett er understand the nature of 
this common performance, special att ention can be paid to a curious coincidence 
in the history of ideas: when it comes to the issue of identifying and explaining the 
main features of human perception, diff erent thinkers resort to a comparison with 
the situation of the blind man and his aid stick. Take for instance Descartes and his 
famous passages from the Dioptrics: 
By means of his stick a blind man observes diff erences between trees, stones, 
water, and so on, apparently just as great as those between red, yellow, green 
and other colors, and […] there is nothing in these various bodies to make 
the diff erences except their diff erent ways of moving the stick or resisting its 
movements. (Descartes 1971[1637]: 241–242)
When our blind man [holding two sticks and crossing them in front of him, 
the contact point being E] […] turns his hand A towards E, or again his hand 
C towards E, the nerves inserted in the hand cause a change in his brain, and 
this enables his soul to know not only the places A or C, but also any other 
places lying on the straight line AE or CE. […] Similarly, when our eye or head 
is turned in a given direction, our soul is made aware of it by the change in the 
brain that is produced by the nerves inserted in the muscles that execute the 
movement. (Descartes 1971[1637]: 248–249)
Or consider Donald T. Campbell’s quotation, always in a context of analysis focused 
on visual perception:
Blind locomotor search is the more primary, the more direct exploration. A blind 
man’s cane is a vicarious search process. Th e less expensive cane movements 
substitute for blind trials and wasted movements by the whole body, removing 
costly search from the full locomotor eff ort […]. Th e substitutability of cane 
locomotion for body locomotion, the equivalence of opaque-to-cane and 
opaque-to-body, is a contingent discovery, although one which seems more 
nearly “entailed”, or to involve a less complex, a less presumptive model of the 
physical world than does the substitutability of light waves or radar waves for 
body locomotion. (Campbell 1987[1974]: 60)
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Th is is instead how Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2005[1945]: 165–166) uses the same 
example while addressing the psychological issue of habit:
Th e blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer 
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the 
scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight. […] Th e 
position of things is immediately given through the extent of the reach which 
carries him to it, which comprises besides the arm’s own reach the stick’s range 
of action. If I want to get used to a stick, I try it by touching a few things with 
it, and eventually I have it ‘well in hand’, I can see what things are ‘within reach’ 
or out of reach of my stick. […] To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be 
transplanted into them, or conversely, to incorporate them into the bulk of our 
own body. Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-world, or 
changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments. 
Again, while questioning the inside/outside physical dichotomy with respect to a 
communication system, Gregory Bateson (2000[1972]: 251) claims the following:
It is not communicationally meaningful to ask whether the blind man’s stick or 
the scientist’s microscope are “parts” of the man who uses them. Both stick and 
microscope are important pathways of communication and, as such, are parts of 
the network in which we are interested; but no boundary line – e.g., halfway up 
the stick – can be relevant in a description of the topology of this net. 
Finally, a passage taken from Michael Kubovy (1988: 152; emphasis mine) makes 
explicit the kernel of the whole issue:
If you are walking in the dark feeling your way about with a cane, you are 
unaware of the pressure of the cane on the palm of your hand; all your att ention 
is focused on the nature of the obstacles revealed by the of the cane. Under these 
circumstances, if you had to classify the cane as part of the world or part of your body, 
you would most likely say that it was part of your body. Th is is true of all tools. 
On one side, the fi rst two quotations suggest the possibility of replacing our organs 
with vicarious technologies, but two diff erent things can be substituted one for the 
other if they fulfi ll the same needs and their functions get enough closer so as to 
allow them to perform more or less identical actions in respect to the environment. 
On the other side, the last three quotations point to the meaninglessness of such 
distinctions as in/out and organic/inorganic, which lose value exactly when the 
pragmatic analogy holds true, since what really matt ers is the fact that both organs 
and tools, by being interchangeable, share the same signifi cance for the organism, 
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regardless of their material constitution or physical collocation. Th ough an absolute 
or literal identity between sticks and eyes cannot be established, all authors seem 
thus to share the presumption that objects and instruments (in a word, technology) 
are exosomatic organs mediating between human body and outside world. 
Such an interpretation already follows quite naturally from the observation 
that several living organisms other than man do use devices or means (terms to 
be preferred here to human tools or instruments, so as to keep the discourse on an 
analogical plane). As a fi rst example, the weaver ant (Oecophylla smaragdina) is an 
arboreal species whose adults are able to roll up leaves and piece them together by 
soft ly squeezing the larvae with their jaws, so that they release a drop of silk to be 
used as a kind of glue. Th us, “the ants then carry the larvae along the entire length of 
the leaf edges, squeezing as they go, using the larvae like living bott les of glue, until 
the edges of the leaves are stuck together from end to end” (Shuker 2001: 191).
As a second example, the diving bell spider (Argyroneta aquatica) is a species 
that can live under water by building “diving bell” webs or air bubbles, anchoring 
them through silk threads to support materials like water plants, fi lling them with air 
and, eventually, using them as submarine houses where to eat, molt, mate and raise 
off spring. Th e overall apparatus allows a process of gas exchange (carbon dioxide 
with oxygen) that is driven by diff erences in partial pressure and water solubility 
of the components and serves as an underwater gill; in fact, the system has been 
referred to as a sort of ‘aqualung’ (Flynn, Bush 2008).
Th e technological metaphors (glue and aqualung) used by scientists relate these 
behaviours to the case of the blind and the cane and suggest a specifi c sense of the 
concept of mediation between organisms and environment. By relying on the work 
of Arnold Gehlen about the essential connection between instruments and human 
body features, in his article on exosomatic organs Robert E. Innis states that the 
formers “can be analyzed under the threefold rubric of compensation, extension, 
and substitution” (Innis 1984: 68). A hammer, for instance, extends the power of the 
hand for pounding and compensates for the relative fragility of human tissues and 
bones; similarly, wheels (and the apparatus they belong to) substitute feet and other 
locomotive structures, extend the distance that can be traversed and compensate 
for the limited speed achievable just through organic movement. In this respect, 
the performances of organs, non-human devices and tools can all be interpreted as 
extensive, substitutive and compensative actions.
To understand the assumptions underlying such a generalization, it can be 
assumed the schematic model of a living being proposed by Bateson (2009[1951]) 
as a minimal system consisting of a self-corrective internal causal circuit, acting on 
the environment and upon which the environment itself acts. External infl uences 
are perturbations of the systemic self-organization of the components (homeo-
stasis) from which the entity is constituted; at the same time, the environment is 
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a source of preservation for the living system and hence the latt er accomplishes 
several transformative operations on the former. It follows that coordination 
between internal and external processes of diff erent types is required and the 
institution of this correspondence is called by Bateson (2009[1951]: 169) “codi-
fi cation”. Specifi cally, the congruence between inside and outside is pursued by the 
system through the att empt to operate (or act) on objects and events.
Th is understanding of the notion of action encompasses all the aforementioned 
examples: the reconnoitering movements of the eye and the stick are not passive 
processes, but active operations to collect information that, despite not actually 
changing the environment, are in any case meant to modify the relations between 
it and the organism, so as to fulfi ll its requirements; the percussion movements of 
the fi st and the hammer are transformations of the physical status of reality so as to 
make it congruent with internal needs; the foot and the wheel, the air bubble and 
the aqualung, the silk and the glue are all devices and instruments through which a 
certain kind of action – functional to the type of organism/environment congruence 
that is looked for – is made possible.
Besides, in his analysis Bateson maintains that, as for the organic model, the 
boundary between what can be said to belong to the self or the environment is 
arbitrary: “the organism includes within the self various objects and events outside 
its skin but intimately connected to him, while he labels as parts of the environment 
certain of his own body parts or functions” (Bateson 2009[1951]: 189; emphasis 
mine). Th is means that as long as certain elements, whether they be internal 
(endosomatic) or external (exosomatic), promote homeostasis, they can be defi ned 
as systemic or belonging to the set of perceptive-active operations of the living unity. 
Any component that is, to say, ‘caught’ in this net of relations and proves to be useful 
is subjected to an operation of meaning att ribution that selects some of its properties 
and makes it a part of a whole: it becomes thus functio nalized or re-functionalized, 
indeed something akin to the core of exaptation. 
What was just said applies to the typology of exaptations articulated by Telmo 
Pievani (2003). Whether the factor at stake is a constraining developmental path 
that encounters diff erential environmental conditions, or a single (or a set of) gene 
whose expression (protein) undergoes a change in time production or localization, 
or a whole organ that becomes useful for a new use because of ethological and 
ecological transformations, always the same occurs: a component is inserted in a 
new relational web, thereby becoming functional to the homeostatic working of a 
single system or a set of subsystems and, in turn, to the entire organism. 
To conclude, this application of Bateson’s perspective is, fi rst of all, a strong 
counter-argument to possible critiques directed against the recognition of simila-
rities between organs and tools: if one adheres to a systemic view of living beings, 
the organic/inorganic dichotomy blurs (without considering the fact that the intra-
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corporeal exploitation of inorganic compounds is already a constitutive aspect of 
life as such). Secondly, tools and devices themselves, intentionally and naturally 
produced by means of selective and combinatory operations, seem to refl ect the 
very nature of the agents that make use of them, in a twofold sense: on one side, 
they enable them to perform actions, in this being ‘active’ like their utilizers; on 
the other side, they exhibit systemic properties, exactly as organisms do. Th irdly, 
since the whole reasoning is constitutively based on a broad interpretation of the 
concept of communication, it immediately takes on a quasi-semiotic dimension. 
Finally, the very terminology adopted (“pragmatic”) is fully semiotic to the extent 
that the underlying argument consistently fi ts Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, where the 
meaning of concepts (in our case, organs, devices and tools) consists in the practical-
experiential consequences they entail for the subject of action.
4. Functions and defi nitions of exaptations 
In the previous analysis the notion of function has come to have a central role: organs 
and tools follow similar directions in the historical and structural process leading 
them to the acquisition of a general function of action towards the environment. 
Th is imposes a requirement on the modelling att empt, that is the adoption of an as 
general as possible schematization of what it means to perform a function, able to 
encompass satisfactorily both biological and technological instances. 
Despite the fact that a “history of att empts by philosophers to clarify the notion 
of function exhibits all the strengths and weaknesses of this sort of undertaking” 
(Hull 1998: 223), Larry Wright’s article “Functions” (1973) is appropriate for a 
number of reasons: fi rstly, it has been considered to stand out as “seminal” (Hull 
1998: 224) and hence is an authoritative reference; secondly, it explicitly off ers 
a unifying view on biological and technological functions; thirdly, the formula it 
proposes can be applied, with opportune modifi cations, to the types of exaptations 
described by Arnold; eventually, the distinction it draws between functionality and 
usefulness, by avoiding to directly call into question phenomena of adaptation, is 
well suited to some interpretations of Darwinism and parallels an almost identical 
critique in the context of evolutionary biology.
As for the last point, Wright complains about those accounts that fail to handle 
what he claims to be one of the most important distinctions to be concerned with 
when refl ecting on functions, namely accidental versus non-accidental situations. 
In his words: “Something can do something useful purely by accident, but […] 
something that I does by accident cannot be the function of I. […] Buckles stop 
bullets only by accident. Blowouts only accidentally keep us off  doomed airplanes. 
Sweep hands only accidentally brush dust, if they do it at all” (Wright 1973: 147). 
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Th e incapacity of some theories to embrace this distinction reminds of the dispute 
on the extension of such notions as adaptation and natural selection that sees the 
opposition between neo- and post-Darwinism, a debate from which exaptation 
itself derives. Th is similarity clearly appears from the following quotation: 
Following Williams, we may designate as an adaptation any feature that 
promotes fi tness and was built by selection for its current role (criterion 
of historical genesis). Th e operation of an adaptation is its function. We may 
also follow Williams in labeling the operation of a useful character not built 
by selection for its current role as an eff ect. […] Adaptations have functions; 
exaptations have eff ect. (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6)
Th e exaptive switch is the fi nal outcome of a process through which something, 
originally useful in some respect just accidentally (it is not a function, neither in 
Williams nor in Wright’s sense), ends up taking on that usefulness as its own 
function, therewith turning an incident into the very reason of its maintenance. 
Hence, Wright’s criticism is indirectly and negatively referring to mechanisms also 
at work in the production of exaptations. 
Such a coincidence between analytic philosophy and evolutionary biology 
regards the examples adopted as well: as for Wright “it is absurd to say with 
Pangloss that the function of the human nose is to support eyeglasses” (Wright 
1973: 148), so for Gould and Richard C. Lewontin (Gould, Lewontin 1979: 581–
585) “the adaptationist programme is truly Panglossian” because of “its failure to 
distinguish current utility from reasons for origin”. Th ere is no proof that the latt ers 
got acquainted with the former; it might simply be that Voltaire did go at the heart 
of our cognitive att itude, touching a common epistemological issue. Whatever the 
case, Wright’s article appears to be born out of similar problems and distinctions to 
those that later led to the precise identifi cation of exaptation.
Coming to the point, this is how the results of his analysis are summarized 
(Wright 1973: 161):
Th e function of X is Z means 
(a) X is there because it does Z;
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there.
Th is formula is meant to represent a necessary and suffi  cient condition for something 
to be a function and, by taking into account the past causal background of the 
phenomena under consideration, allows to rule out accidental instances. It includes 
both conscious and natural cases: “[t]he reason the sweep-secondhand is there is 
that it makes seconds easier to read. It is there because it does that”. Moreover, “[w]e 
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can say that the natural function of something – say, an organ in an organism – is the 
reason the organ is there by invoking natural selection. […] we can say animals have 
kidneys because they eliminate metabolic wastes from the bloodstream” (Wright 
1973: 158–159). 
Before modifying the formula so as to make it apt to defi ne what is not the 
consequence of selection and thus at the beginning merely fortuitous, a clarifi cation 
about the evolutionary connection between adaptation and exaptation is required. 
A character with a previous function (adaptation) can begin for a number of 
reasons to bring about accidental eff ects; when these, because of changes in the 
selective regime, become the grounds for its utility from that moment onwards, two 
things can happen: either the character undergoes modifi cations that transform it 
entirely and give rise to a secondary adaptation; or small (or not at all) subsequent 
refi nements occur, so that the character continues to be identifi able as basically 
the same, thereby acquiring the logical status of exaptation. Th e situation can be 
ambiguous and poses a problem of distinction: “[i]nevitably, there will be border-
line cases where the term exaptation is hardly worth employing because the original 
trait has changed so much that it is scarcely recognizable” (Arnold 1994: 127). Th at 
is, something can be both an adaptation and an exaptation simultaneously or one 
before the other sequentially.
Both aspects are acknowledged by Gould and Vrba: on one side, if an “aptation” 
is defi ned as the general phenomenon of being fi t, then “the set of aptations 
existing at any one time consists of two partially overlapping subsets: the subset of 
adaptations and the subset of exaptations” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 6); on the other side, 
when considering for instance the evolution of feathers and wings from dinosaurs to 
birds, “[w]e see, in this scenario, a sequential set of adaptations, each converted to an 
exaptation of diff erent eff ect that sets the basis for a subsequent adaptation” (Gould, 
Vrba 1982: 7). Th e last point is implicitly contained in Wright’s account as well: 
though “this analysis makes a clear and cogent distinction between function and 
accident”, nevertheless “it is worth noting that something can get a function – either 
conscious or natural – as the result of an accident of this sort” and, in agreement with 
the words of Gould and Vrba, “that only disqualifi es an organ from functionhood for 
the fi rst – or the fi rst few – generations. If it survives by dint of its doing something, 
then that something becomes its function on this analysis” (Wright 1973: 165). 
However, even though one sequence (adaptation/exaptation/next adaptation) 
parallels the other (function/eff ect/next function), there is not a perfect 
coincidence: an exaptation (or eff ect, in Williams’ terminology) is accidental just 
in respect to the previous selective regime that shaped the character and made it an 
adaptation; but it is not an accident at all insofar the new context of signifi cance is 
concerned, that cooperates in the production of the exaptation or eff ect by selecting 
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functionally the old trait (and hence promoting fi tness), but with no further or 
substantial modifi cations of its shape (that is, diff erently from Wright, you have a 
function that is not an adaptation). 
Th is said, to apply the original formula to Arnold’s typology, fi rstly, it has to be 
considered valid to characterize functions as adaptations; secondly, its wording must 
be revised so as to refer to eff ects of unmodifi ed traits aft er the change of selective 
regime; thirdly, the temporal dimension needs to be properly signaled grammatically 
(simple present is substituted with present continuous, which implies a stronger 
conceptual diff erentiation from past events). Accordingly, the defi nition of a fi rst-
use exaptation is the following:
Th e eff ect of X is Z means 
(a) X is there because it is doing Z;
(b) X was not there because of Z;
(c) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there. 
[Sutures in the skulls of young birds and reptiles probably has arisen fr om the laws of 
growth, with no specifi c function, and only later where coopted because of their advantage 
in the parturition of higher mammals; example taken from C. R. Darwin and quoted 
in Gould, Vrba 1982: 5.] 
By accepting Wright’s indication – “the notion of something having more than one 
function is derivative. It is obtained by substituting something like ‘partly because’ 
for ‘because’ in the formula” (Wright 1973: 166) – this is instead the defi nition of an 
extra-use addition exaptation in respect to the most recent usefulness: 
Th e eff ect of X is Z
(a) X is there partly because it is doing Z;
(b) X is there partly because it does Y;
(c) Z and Y are consequences (or results) of X’s being there.
[Feathers began to allow birds to fl y fr om a certain historical moment onwards, but 
this eff ect did not supersede the previous function of thermoregulation; therefore, both 
thermoregulation and fl ying are now causes and consequences of their being there; 
example taken from Gould, Vrba 1982: 7.]
Th e complete interchange between two subsequent utilities promoting fi tness, 
namely an extra-use transfer exaptation, can be fi nally expressed as follows:
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 Th e eff ect of X is Z means 
(a) X is there partly because it is doing Z;
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there;
(c) X is there partly because it did Y;
(d) Y was a consequence (or result) of X’s being there.
[Th e shell of chelonians performs the main role of skeletal support of the trunk fr om the 
vertebral column and this consequence is the reason why it is now selected; however, the 
shell owes its existence also to the fact that once was probably performing the function of 
external protection, which is no more something it does and hence cannot currently be the 
consequence for which it is selected; example taken from Arnold 1994: 144.]
For Wright’s analysis has been pursued to come up with a unifying view, this 
classifi cation pertains also to technological-conscious phenomena of re-functio-
nalization. Besides, further grounds for the construction of a general frame work are 
provided by his interpretation of the notion of selection.
Aft er agreeing with the standard view, which identifi es selection with conscious 
choice, Wright claims that other uses of the notion can be understood as extensions 
of this defi nition, namely by “drawing att ention to specifi c individual features 
of the paradigm which occur in subconscious or nonconscious cases” (Wright 
1973: 163). Within the conscious cases, it is possible to distinguish between 
“mere discrimination” (selection without any apparent reason) and “consequence-
selection” (selection by virtue of resultant advantage). In the latt er, “the consequence 
is the function” and “it is specifi cally this kind of selection of which natural selection 
represents an extension” (Wright 1973: 163). Th e parallel Wright is drawing is the 
following (Wright 1973: 164): just as in biological evolution, given the trait X, the 
causal consequence Z and the environment, X will be selected automatically (to be 
read not in a necessary-deterministic fashion, rather as absence of intentionality), 
so in our conscious behaviour, given the object X, the causal consequence Z 
and our criteria (corresponding to the ‘human environment’), X will be selected 
automatically. Th us, “consequence-selection, by contrast with mere discrimination, 
de-emphasizes volition in just such a way as to blur its distinction from natural 
selection on precisely this point” (Wright 1973: 164). 
Two remarks are worth making. On the one hand, though Wright’s theory 
accounts for functions and adaptations, it is applicable to exaptations as well once 
the addition or transfer performance, originally fortuitous, becomes the new 
consequence Z for which X is selected from that moment onwards according to 
a given environmental situation. On the other hand, despite Wright’s intentions, 
the selecting process might have nothing to do with natural selection: both in 
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biological evolution and technological development there actually happen co-
options of incidental consequences of traits and tools without substantial optimizing 
modifi cations of their features, hence not becoming adaptations, which on the 
contrary is by defi nition a process whereby “the average state of a character becomes 
improved with reference to a specifi c function” (Futuyma 2005: 544).
Before turning to the conclusions, it must be noticed that if the consequence Z of 
an entity X is the cause of its selection – “Z must be or create conditions conducive 
to the survival or maintenance of X” (Wright 1973: 164) – and any X, by performing 
diff erent actions, can take part into several connections, then any exaptation of X 
is defi nable as the selection of one or more causal consequences, induced by contextual 
variation, within a set of possible actions realizable by X. Since such a reading of the 
phenomenon discloses a systemic perspective, biosemiotics – the semiotic modelling 
of systemic relations – provides therefore an adequate theoretical framework for its 
treatment (Eder, Rembold 1992; Kull et al. 2008; Favareau 2010).
5. Conclusions and research prospects
Th ree conclusions have been reached by the present research. Firstly, there exists 
an analogy of production between organs and tools. At least in some cases, they 
resemble each other in the way they originate and change, since both fulfi ll 
needs, exploit natural phenomena, arise through the combination of pre-existing 
elements and can undergo subsequent phases of functional shift  and refi nement or 
improvement. 
Secondly, there is a pragmatic analogy between organs, animal devices and 
human tools. In some instances all are means of mediation, to be understood as 
a compensative, extensive and substitutive action meant to transform favourably 
the set of relations established between a living subject and its environment. Above 
all, a communication-based approach to the topic blurs and eventually proves as 
misleading, if not totally wrong, such historical (and still on) distinctions as in/out, 
organic/inorganic, natural/artifi cial, and so forth (for the philosophical relevance 
of this theme, see postmodernism and cyborg theory, for instance Haraway 1991)1.
Th irdly, the notion of function, implicitly operating throughout the twofold 
analogical comparison and essential to the very defi nition of exaptation, has been 
analysed from an analytic-philosophical perspective, where Wright’s theory, able to 
unify natural and conscious functions, has allowed a defi nitional schematization of 
Arnold’s classifi cation of exaptations. Th e resulting formulation of general types of 
functionalization (fi rst-use and extra-use) is both extendable to the technological 
1 I thank scholar Tiina Pitkäjärvi for making me notice the connection.
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dimension and developable into a semiotic typology of exaptations (for a biosemiotic 
notion of function, see for instance Emmeche 2002; cf. also Weible 2012).
Besides, two notions (logically complementary) have been a background theme 
of the whole reasoning: on one side, the concept of selection runs in parallel to that of 
combination, since the consequence of a trait is selected on the basis of its arrangement 
with other elements; on the other side, both functionalization and re-functionalization 
are processes of the system to which the trait happens to start belonging.
As far as modelling is concerned, a further similarity is decisive at this point, 
since there exists another reality that, as much as technology and close to semiotics, 
behaves like a system, develops through selection and combination of already 
existing elements and performs actions. As a matt er of fact, several authors have 
thought of language as a technology:
Language – and its extensions in script and print – is, by reason of its fl exibility 
and refl exive structures, the most distinctive of all exosomatic organs. […] if 
we look closely enough we can see that the structure of embodiment relations 
used to explicate probes and canes […] perhaps applies also to language with a 
vengeance. (Innis 1984: 83)
Consider a familiar tool or artifact, say a pair of scissors. Such an artifact typically 
exhibits a kind of double adaptation – a two-way fi t, both to the user and to the 
task. On the one hand, the shape of the scissors is remarkably well fi tt ed to the 
form and the manipulative capacities of the human hand. On the other hand (so 
to speak), the artifact, when it is in use, confers on the agent some characteristic 
powers or capacities which humans do not naturally possess: the ability to make 
neat straight cuts in certain papers and fabrics, the ability to open bubble packs, 
and so forth. Th is is obvious enough; why else would we value the artifact at all?
Public language is in many ways the ultimate artifact. Not only does it 
confer on us added powers of communication; it also enables us to reshape a 
variety of diffi  cult but important tasks into formats bett er suited to the basic 
computational capacities of the human brain. Just as scissors enable us to exploit 
our basic manipulative capacities to fulfi ll new ends, language enables us to 
exploit our basic cognitive capacities of patt ern recognition and transformation 
in ways that reach out to new behavioral and intellectual horizons. Moreover, 
public language may even exhibit the kind of double adaptation described 
above, and may hence constitute a body of linguistic artifacts whose form is 
itself in part evolved so as to exploit the contingencies and biases of human 
learning and recall. (Clark 1998: 193–194)
According to the previous conclusions, language can thus be considered ana logically 
both as an organ and a tool and the work of Lass (1990; 1997) in particular off ers an 
appropriate conceptual apparatus to this comparative approach.
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First of all, from the methodological viewpoint, he repeatedly stresses how the 
relation between organisms and languages must be properly understood: “[I]t is 
important to note that by comparing X and Y as terms of an analogy I am not saying 
that X=Y. […] by saying that much of the methodology of historical linguistics is 
‘like’ that of geology or evolutionary biology, one is not saying that languages are 
rocks or organisms” (Lass 1997: 293, fn 10). Hence, “on the tack I take here, the 
consilience is with what we know of the behavior of a large class of non-linguistic 
system types” (Lass 1997: 384; emphasis mine). 
Secondly, he refers to examples, theories and metaphors taken from evolutionary 
biology and, particularly, from Gould himself. For instance, as the giant panda, 
at some point of his evolution, lost the digit corresponding to our thumb (Gould 
1980) and later on co-opted another forelimb bone to make a new thumb – that is 
“[t]ypes of change can and do recur, and old types of objects (if in diff erent shapes) 
may re-emerge” (Lass 1997: 298) – so “[l]ong-term cycles of change are familiar 
from the histories of many (I would suspect most) languages” (Lass 1997: 298). 
Similarly, in languages there happens something “not dissimilar to the picture of 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ suggested by Eldredge & Gould (1972) […]; evolution 
in their (controversial but arguable) view is not steady change, but shows stasis as a 
background, with fairly short bursts of dramatic speciation activity at odd intervals 
[…]. I think the evidence in the case of languages is as good as it can be” (Lass 
1997: 304)2. Eventually, just as “natural systems like the genomes contain enormous 
amounts of non-functional material” (Lass 1997: 313–314) and this “non-expressed 
variability may eventually serve as a reservoir for evolutionary change”, so “[t]he 
same seems to be true of linguistic junk” (Lass 1997: 314–315).
Th irdly and above all, languages do evolve by means of exaptations. Among Lass’ 
examples (Lass 1997: 317–318) there are the development of the Germanic strong 
verb (when late Western Indo-European lost its aspect system, the old perfect and 
aorist morphophonology were redeployed as a marker of number) and, in English, 
the old number opposition “you” vs. “thou”, that was pragmatically exapted to 
distinguish between an unmarked and an ‘aff ective’ pronoun. Moreover, grammati-
cization and new grammatical categories can occur and develop through new 
functional co-options, as for instance in the development of grammaticized aspects 
in Germanic or the rise of marked progressive aspect in English (further references 
thereupon are Lass 1990; Traugott  2004; Fanego 2004; Narrog 2007).
Lass’ understanding of language change, founded on the images and terms of 
complexity, chaos and systems theories (“phase-space”, “epigenetic landscapes”, 
2 Lass refers to Eldredge, Niles; Gould, Stephen J. 1972. Punctuated equilibria: An alternative 
to phyletic gradualism. In: Schopf, Th omas J. M. (ed.), Models of Paleobiology. San Francisco: 
Freeman, Cooper, 82–115.
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“att ractors”, “chreods”, and so on; cf. Lass 1997: 293–303; for a description of his 
model, Lass 370–383), provides a very comprehensive framework which it is worth 
working on:
I am convinced […] that there is such a thing as a theory of ‘historically evolved 
systems’, and that virtually any such system that meets certain criteria is going 
to show phenomena that look like junk-deposition. In other words, human 
cultural evolution (or the evolution of human cultural artifacts, which is almost 
certainly not the same thing), like the evolution of biological systems, is based at 
least partly on bricolage, cobbling, jerry-building, whatever you want to call it; 
pieces of such systems are always falling off  and if not lost are recycled, oft en in 
amazingly original and clever ways. (Lass 1998: 316; emphases mine)
Th is contribution to already existing viewpoints on language change based on 
systems theory (for a review, see Nöth 1990: 202–204) establishes the centrality of 
exaptive phenomena for language and, in turn, for semiotics, thereby determining 
the plausibility to set up a provisional research plan for the proper development of a 
semiotic model of exaptation.3 
References
Allen, Peter M.; Andriani, Pierpaolo 2007. Diversity, interconnectivity and sustainability. 
In: Bogg, Jan; Geyer, Robert (eds.), Complexity, Science and Society. Oxford: Radcliff e 
Publishing, 11–32.
Arnold, Edwin Nicholas 1994. Investigating the origins of performance advantage: adaptation, 
exaptation and lineage eff ects. In: Eggleton, Paul; Vane-Wright, Richard Irwin (eds.), 
Phylogenetics and Ecology. London: Th e Linnean Society of London, 123–168.
Arthur, William B. 2007. Th e structure of invention. Research Policy 36: 274–287.
–  2009. Th e Nature of Technology. What It Is and How It Evolves. New York: Free Press.
Basalla, George 1988. Th e Evolution of Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bateson, Gregory 2000[1972]. Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, 
Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
–  2009[1951]. Information and codiﬁcation: A philosophical approach. In: Ruesch, Jurgen; 
Bateson, Gregory (eds.), Communication: Th e Social Matrix of Psychiatry. New York: Norton, 
168–211.
3 Th is research was supported by European Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Inter-
nationalisation Programme DoRa. Th e current work has been carried out partaking in the 
research project IUT2–44 (Semiotic modelling of self-description mechanisms: Th eory and 
applications), and in the activities of the Centre of Excellence in Cultural Th eory (CECT).
 Approaching a semiotics of exaptation 525
Campbell, Donald T. 1987[1974]. Evolutionary epistemology. In: Radnitzky, Gerard; Bartley, 
William W. (eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge. La 
Salle: Open Court, 47–90.
Catt ani, Gino 2005. Preadaptation, fi rm heterogeneity, and technological performance: A study 
on the evolution of fi ber optics, 1970–1995. Organization Science 16(6): 563–580.
Clark, Andy 1998. Being Th ere. Putt ing Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge: MIT 
Press.
Constant, Edward W. 1980. Th e Origins of the Turbojet Revolution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press.
Descartes, René 1971[1637]. Th e dioptrics. In: Anscombe, Gertrude E. M.; Geach, Peter T. 
(eds.), Philosophical Writings: Descartes. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 240–256.
Eder, Jörg; Rembold, Heinz 1992. Biosemiotics – a paradigm of biology. Naturwissenschaft en 79: 
60–67.
Emmeche, Claus 2002. Th e chicken and the Orphean egg: On the function of meaning and the 
meaning of function. Sign Systems Studies 30(1): 15–32.
Fanego, Teresa 2004. Some strategies for coding sentential subjects in English: From exaptation 
to grammaticalization. Studies in Language 28(2): 321–361
Favareau, Donald 2010. Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Commentary. Berlin: 
Springer.
Flynn, Morris R.; Bush, John W. M. 2008. Underwater breathing: Th e mechanics of plastron 
respiration. Journal of Fluid Mechanics 608: 275–296. 
Futuyma, Douglas J. 2005. Evolution. Sunderland: Sinauer Associates.
Gilfi llan, S. Colum 1935. Inventing the Ship. Chicago: Follett  Publishing.
Gould, Stephen J. 1980. Th e Panda’ s Th umb: More Refl ections in Natural History. New York: 
Norton.
Gould, Stephen J.; Lewontin, Richard C. 1979. Th e spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist programme. Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London B 205(1161): 581–598. 
Gould, Stephen J.; Vrba, Elisabeth S. 1982. Exaptation – a missing term in the science of form. 
Paleobiology 8(1): 4–15.
Gregory, T. Ryan 2008. Th e evolution of complex organs. Evo Edu Outreach 1: 358–389.
Haraway, Donna 1991. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: Th e Reinvention of Nature. New York: Rout-
ledge.
Hoff meyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
–  2008. Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: 
University of Scranton Press.
Hoff meyer, Jesper; Kull, Kalevi 2003. Baldwin and biosemiotics: What intelligence is for. 
In: Weber, Bruce H.; Depew, David J. (eds.), Evolution and Learning: Th e Baldwin Eff ect 
Reconsidered. Cambridge: Th e MIT Press, 253–272.
Hull, David L. 1998. Introduction to Part IV. In: Hull, David  L.; Ruse, Michael (eds.), Th e 
Philosophy of Biology. New York: Oxford University Press, 223–226.
Innis, Robert E. 1984. Technics and the bias of perception. Philosophy & Social Criticism 10: 67–89.
–  2009. Semiotics of technology. In: Olsen, Jan K. B.; Pedersen, Stig A.; Hendricks, Vincent F. 
(eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology. New York: Blackwell Publishing, 141–145.
526 Davide Weible
Kotov, Kaie; Kull, Kalevi 2011. Semiosphere is the relational biosphere. In: Emmeche, Claus; 
Kull, Kalevi (eds.), Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. London: Imperial 
College Press, 79–194.
Krampen, Martin 1997. Models of semiosis. In: Posner, Roland; Robering, Klaus; Sebeok, 
Th omas A. (eds.), Semiotics: A Handbook on the Sign-Th eoretic Foundations of Nature and 
Culture. Vol. 1: Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 247–287.
Kubovy, Michael 1988[1986]. Th e Psychology of Perspective and Renaissance Art. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Kull, Kalevi 1998. Baerian biology: Evolution by means of organisms’ interpretation. In: Farré. 
George L.; Oksala, Tarkko (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, Organization. Espoo: 
Finnish Academy of Technology, 197–200.
–  1999. Outlines for a post-Darwinian biology. Folia Baeriana 7: 129–142.
–  2004. Uexküll and the post-modern evolutionism. Sign Systems Studies 32(1/2): 99–114. 
Kull, Kalevi; Emmeche, Claus; Favareau, Donald 2008. Biosemiotic questions. Biosemiotics 
1(1): 41–55.
Lass, Roger 1990. How to do things with junk: exaptation in language evolution. Journal of 
Linguistics 26: 79–102.
–  1997. Historical Linguistics and Language Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lotman, Juri M. 1991. Technological progress as a problem in the study of culture. Poetics Today 
12(4): 781–800.
–  2005[1984]. On the semiosphere. Sign Systems Studies 33(1): 205–229.
Markoš, Anton 2002. Readers of the Book of Life: Conceptualizing Developmental Evolutionary 
Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–  2004. In the quest for novelty: Kauff man’s biosphere and Lotman’s semiosphere. Sign Systems 
Studies 32(1): 309–326.
Markoš, Anton; Grygar, Filip; Hajnal, László; Kleisner, Karel; Kratochvil, Zdeněk; Neubauer, 
Zdeněk 2009. Life as its Own Designer: Darwin’s Origin and Western Th ought. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
McLennan, Deborah A. 2008. Th e concept of co-option: Why evolution oft en looks miraculous. 
Evo Edu Outreach 1: 247–258.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 2005[1945]. Phenomenology of Perception. [Landes, Donald, trans.] 
London: Routledge.
Metcalfe, John S. 1998. Evolutionary Economics and Creative Destruction. London: Routledge.
Mokyr, Joel 1990. Punctuated equilibria and technological progress. American Economic 
Associated Papers and Proceedings 80(2): 350–354.
Narrog, Heiko 2007. Exaptation, grammaticalization, and reanalysis. California Linguistic Notes 
32(1): 1–26.
Nöth, Winfried 1990. Handbook of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Pievani, Telmo 2003. Rhapsodic evolution: Essay on exaptation and evolutionary pluralism. 
World Futures 59(2): 63–81.
Saviott i, Pier Paolo; Metcalfe, John S. (eds.) 1991. Evolutionary Th eories of Economic and Techno-
logical Change: Present Status and Future Prospects. Reading: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Sebeok, Th omas A.; Danesi, Marcel 2000. Th e Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Th eory and 
Semiotic Analysis. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyer.
 Approaching a semiotics of exaptation 527
Shuker, Karl P. N. 2001. Th e Hidden Powers of Animals: Uncovering the Secrets of Nature. London: 
Marshall Editions.
Traugott , Elizabeth C. 2004. Exaptation and grammaticalization. In: Akimoto, Minoji (ed.), 
Linguistic Studies Based on Corpora. Tokyo: Hituzi Syobo Publishing Co., 133–156.
Weible, Davide 2012. Exaptation and ritualization: Towards a theory of hierarchical contextua-
lity? Biosemiotics 5(2): 211–226.
West-Eberhard, Mary J. 2003. Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Wright, Larry 1973. Functions. Th e Philosophical Review 82(2): 139–168.
К семиотике экзаптации: 
 в точке соприкосновения биологической эволюции и 
технологического развития
В статье отмечаются точки соприкосновения между биологической эволюцией и техноло ги-
ческим развитием, и на этой основе делается попытка выработать семиотический под ход к 
явлению экзаптации в эволюции. Для достижения этой цели сначала описывается историко-
структурная и прагматическая аналогии между человеческими органами и орудиями труда, 
что на коммуникативном уровне, в свою очередь, указывает на присоединение некоторых 
им традиционно свой ственных для них характеристик. Затем применяют аналитико-
философский подход к природным и культурным функциям, чтобы определить три типа 
экзаптации.
Eksaptatsiooni semiootikast:   
bioloogilise evolutsiooni ja tehnoloogilise arengu lõikumispunktis
Artiklis täheldatakse konkreetset vastavust bioloogilise evolutsiooni ning tehnoloogia arengu 
vahel ning püütakse sellelt aluselt lähtudes luua semiootilist lähenemist eksaptatsiooninähtusele 
evolutsioonis. Et seda teha, näidatakse ajaloolis-strukturaalset ja pragmaatilist analoogiat 
elundite ning tööriistade vahel, mis kommunikatiivsel pinnal omakorda osutab mõnede nende 
traditsiooniliselt eriomaste omaduste kokkusulamisele. Lõpuks rakendatakse fi losoofi lis-
analüütilist lähenemist looduslikele ja kultuuriliste funktsioonidele, defi neerimaks kolme tüüpi 
eksaptatsiooni.
